

What the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) means for China-Africa Relations and BRICS

Elias Phaahla*

Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa.

*Correspondence: elias.phaahla@uct.ac.za

Received: Oct 5, 2020; Accepted: Dec 17, 2020

Copyright: Elias Phaahla. This is an open-access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). This permits anyone to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt the work, provided the original work and source is appropriately cited.

Citation: Phaahla E. 2020. What the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) means for China-Africa relations and BRICS. Management and Economics Research Journal, 6(S5): 9900030. <https://doi.org/10.18639/MERJ.2020.9900030>

Abstract

Beijing's economic diplomacy has, since the dawn of the millennium, sought to reconfigure the world by championing a new economic order that is predicated on the principles of multipolarity and fairness. The last policy conference of the CPC shed some light on how these policy ideas are to be carried out by Beijing and how they will bear on her relationship with countries from the Global South. This paper considers the policy statements of the CPC during its 19th Congress held in October 2017 as a sneak peek into the future of China's economic diplomacy and the implications for Africa's economic future from the context of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). It argues that China's role as the leader of the BRICS fulcrum reflects her goal to have a global influence that will see erstwhile economic backwaters such as Africa turning their focus away from the West to the East in search of sustainable solutions to their economic challenges.

Keywords: China; Economic Diplomacy; Multi-Polarity; BRICS; Communist Party of China.

1. INTRODUCTION

The 19th Congress of the Communist Party was held from 18 to 24 October 2017 and it was attended by no less than 2200 delegates from across the party structures of the Communist Party. These quinquennial occasions of the Communist Party, are without a doubt, the most important events in the wider body politic of the People's Republic of China (henceforth China). They are, by nature, a conclave of high-ranking and influential power brokers within the party and the apparatus of the Chinese state to decide on the country's future from many fronts – be it economic, social and political, or environmental – amongst other policy considerations. Herein the reality of the modern Chinese state is laid bare to see. The communist rule that formed the mainstay of the second quarter of the 20th century in Mao Zedong's China may at first glance appear to have been consigned to Cold War history, but its legacy reverberates strongly in the current dispensation, so much so that the modern Chinese state finds it almost impossible to shed off the character of its former self.

Against the backdrop of the shifting political and economic undercurrents in China and the international system, what can we learn from the 19th Congress of the CPC from the economic diplomacy point of view, and to what extent does it mirror Beijing's outlook towards the modern-day international political and economic order? As a policy-making platform, the 19th Congress outlined China's foreign policy aspirations, which will implicate directly on how Beijing conducts herself with Africa and the rest of her BRICS partners, despite the two not being mentioned explicitly in the proceedings of the Congress. Similarly, within the context of Beijing's engagements with the world, particularly Africa and the BRICS fulcrum as a whole, what kind of future will the 19th Central Committee (19th CC) of the CPC herald for Beijing's economic diplomacy towards Africa within the wider context of the BRICS grouping?

This paper considers the policy statements of the CPC during its 19th Congress held in October 2017 as a sneak peek into the future of China's economic diplomacy and the implications for Africa's economic future from the context of BRICS. To this end, the paper commences with the Communist Party's global outlook at the turn of the millennium and the impact it has had on Beijing's quest to carve its path in the global economy that has placed a premium on growing interdependence between nation-states. It argues that this period serves as the second watershed moment for Beijing (with the first being in 1978 when it first embarked on economic liberalization) as it sought not only to resuscitate Deng Xiaoping's spirit of 'open door' policy but also to make an attempt at having a centripetal influence that will see China positioning itself as a global player that will offer a framework for global interdependence based on the principles of equity, fairness and equal cooperation. The paper will then move on to address China's plurilateral and multilateral economic engagements with the African continent within the wider scheme of BRICS and what it is purposed to do as a grouping. Ultimately, it will argue that the resolutions of the CPC – although they make no explicit mention of BRICS and Africa – is an important statement of intent for China's economic diplomacy as it taps into economic opportunities provided by new frontiers in its quest to create a global economy that is favorable to Global South interests.

2. THE 19th CONGRESS AND CHINA'S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AFTER THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Within the wider context of China's foreign relations, the turn of the century ushered in the period of revival for the country's economic diplomacy. This saw the country flexing its foreign economic diplomacy muscles in ways not done before. For instance, thanks to Africa's abundant mineral resources and the ever-rising needs of the Chinese economy,

the former was prompted to grant development aid to the countries in need in a *quid pro quo* fashion with the strict condition that they do not give diplomatic support to Taipei¹. China also found allure in the Middle East's abundant oil resources, which resulted in the launch of the 'New Silk Road' initiative to regenerate trade exchanges and investments between the Persian Gulf and Asia (Summers, 2016). The relationship between these two regions has grown and blossomed ever since as a result of this initiative.

The 19th Congress espoused ideals that reinforced these essential principles that have underpinned China's economic revival since the year of reforms in 1978. It was the first turning point moment that saw China embracing an economic system entirely foreign to the one Mao Zedong had envisioned. While the latter frowned upon the rules of the international system, Xiaoping embraced them as a means of achieving the kind of social progress that will usher in the next phase of economic prosperity. These principles continue to reverberate through the social fabric of modern-day China as well as through the structure of the economy. The 19th Congress saw the General Secretary of the CPC, Xi Jinping, being consecrated into modern-day political configurations of China through the adoption of *Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era*. This next phase of China's economic reforms does not depart much from those policy propositions that were adopted after 1978, which were underpinned by a modernized kind of socialism that had strong echoes of social market economics. This pragmatic approach has seen China curbing its poverty levels by over 90 percent and thus becoming the first developing country to realize the UN's Millennium Development Goal of poverty eradication (World Bank, 2017).

In the proceedings of the 19th Congress of the Party, China views socioeconomic success on the domestic front as particularly expedient towards realizing its long-term global leadership ambitions by forging closer ties with Global South countries:

"This is a new historic juncture in China's development. The Chinese nation has stood up, grown rich, and become strong – and it now embraces the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation...It will be an era that sees China moving close to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind...The path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence: and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind (Jinping, 2017)."

The Xi Thought embodies the policy direction China will be pursuing for years to come. This, along with the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC, offers the backstory to how Chinese economic diplomacy has been shaped and framed over the years and there is no doubt that the national Congress is telling of the Party's intent to reinforce and hold on to those ideals. While it tackles a variety of considerations pertaining to modern-day China – from national developmental imperatives to the country's global outlook – it offers an invaluable reference point to understanding China's economic diplomacy under the leadership of Xi Jinping towards its partners on foreign shores. Since the second decade of the 2000s, China's economic diplomacy has been punching above its weight in ways that went on to question the legitimacy of the balance of forces in the realm of the global economy. This is evident through the role the country plays in the BRICS grouping, which it has used to its advantage as an economic diplomacy tool to woo developing nations, including those from Africa, to enter into mutually beneficial economic partnerships. Not only is Beijing prepared to create a new world order that is predicated on principles that depart from those dominated by Washington and the West as a whole, but it also contrives to be the leader of the very new world order it is creating using its economic wherewithal as a useful instrument towards achieving this end.

3. REFLECTIONS IN THE LITERATURE

Previous research has focused on China-Africa relations and South Africa's inclusion into the BRICS bloc without considering how proceedings of previous policy conferences of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implicate Beijing's relationship with the fulcrum and Africa. Many scholars have shown the importance of Africa to Beijing as an emerging power (Alden, 2005; Wang and Elliot, 2014; Taylor, 2009a; Edoho, 2011; Hodzi, 2018), and in the same vein, some have shown the significance of BRICS to China in its quest for global ascendancy and expansion of influence in Global South countries, including those countries in Africa deemed strategically important to Beijing (Taylor, 2016; Taylor, 2018; Shamase, 2019).

While Edoho (2011) emphasizes the significance of Africa to Beijing's ambitions to expand its global influence from the mineral and energy endowment point of view, Taylor (2009b) problematizes China's overreliance on Africa's energy and mineral resources as the reason behind the changing economic circumstances of Africa during the first decade of the century popularly known as 'Africa rising'. In his book, *Africa Rising? BRICS-Diversifying*, Taylor (2009b) contends that Africa's changing fortunes were attributed to China's increased appetite for the continent's mineral resources, which have become essential for the needs of Beijing's growing economy. It is a view shared by scholars such as Dodd (2019), who contends that despite the addition of South Africa into the BRICS family, Africa-BRICS trade is disproportionately dominated by mineral fuels, with most of them destined for Beijing.

Despite China dominating Africa-BRICS trade, Abdenur (2014) maintains that Africa as a continent remains a big priority for BRICS which is being used by the likes of China to legitimize the latter's global multilateral strategy through the recently-founded BRICS Development Bank (hereafter BRICS Bank) in a bid to shake-up the global economic architecture currently dominated by Bretton Woods institutions. In Abdenur's traditions, for instance, the presence of African countries at the 2013 BRICS Summit held in Durban, South Africa, was no accident as it served as a courting exercise to garner African support and trust in BRICS-led leadership on issues of global governance where Beijing will take the leading role.

¹ By no means do we submit that China's increasing relationship with Africa is motivated by mineral resources alone as Beijing enjoys bi-lateral relations with non-mineral rich countries on the continent.

Hence, Abdenur (2014) opines that “Africa specifically has emerged as a relatively significant component in Chinese calculations at diverse levels”, an assertion that follows in the traditions of Cheng and Shi (2009) concerning the nature of China’s foreign policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War era.

Although Abdenur (2014) is sanguine and optimistic about the BRICS Bank acting as the champion of Global South economic interests, pundits belonging to the Marxist side of the ideological spectrum such as Bond (2019) hold the view that the BRICS Bank is nothing short of a stooge of Bretton Woods institutions designed for the express purpose of entrenching the imperial stranglehold of the West on the continent. At first glance Bond (2019) seems to advance old arguments about the alleged neo-colonial presence of China on the continent as that which seeks to expropriate the continent’s vast mineral reserves for her gain as shown in the works of Lumumba-Kasongo (2011) and Wang and Elliot (2014). According to Lesufi and Thompson (2019), a cursory look at BRICS Bank and the strong Chinese influence on the institution points to Beijing serving a semi-peripheral role aimed at funneling resources from the South to the center of imperialism. Hence, “Chinese capitalism emerged as the fulcrum of global capital accumulation on the basis of a subservient role to the leading role of the U.S. as the dominant imperial power” (Lesufi and Thompson, 2019)

The significance of Africa to Beijing remains an important consideration in the debate about the disproportionate influence of Beijing in the BRICS, and inadvertently, on the African continent. Accordingly, Monyae and Nganje (2019) investigate China’s role in industrialization in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) through BRICS. The paper places focus on the many economic opportunities presented by China-SADC trading relations. However, it falls short of casting light on the significance of policy pronouncements of the Chinese Communist Party during its recent policy conference on China-BRICS relations and its implications for Sino-Africa relations in the era of the Xi Thought.

4. CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS AND BRICS

While BRICS became complete in 2010 following the inclusion of South Africa, the turn of the millennium provides an advantageous starting point to assess the growth in maturity of the relationship between Beijing and the African continent. Of course, bilateral relations between China and Africa date back to the 1950s with Egypt becoming the first African country to forge diplomatic relations with China (Wenping, 2007). But much of the period after that – and indeed for most of the Cold War – was characterized by ‘diplomatic neglect’ which resulted in bilateral relations between Beijing and Africa taking a knock before intensifying with the establishment of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at the turn of the millennium. By 2004, the value of China-Africa trade had jumped to 39 percent, and by 2006, China had made a series of infrastructural development pledges including the US\$500 million it pledged for a number of development projects in Ethiopia (Kwaa-Prah, 2007). Fast-forward to 2015, China had delivered US\$60 billion to the continent aimed at energy and transport, which saw countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Zambia getting the bulk of the investment (Johnston and Rudyak, 2017).

But China’s continued presence on the continent is also motivated by its commitment to the BRICS grouping and the multipolar world it aims to create. While the proceedings of the 19th Congress remain silent about Beijing’s commitment to the BRICS agenda, to assume that China has relegated BRICS to the side-lines of its priorities would be a gross misjudgement. Xi Thought makes all-encompassing policy pronouncements that transcend various facets of policy priorities, requiring that it be read in the context of the current changes in the international system in which China is an active participant. Multipolarity and peaceful multilateralism feature prominently on the policy statements of the Xi Thought, which have echoes of the last BRICS Summit held in Xiamen, in which China placed a lot of emphasis on ‘win-win’, cooperation, and equality as essential considerations for the building of fair world order (BRICS, 2017).

Prior to the 19th Congress, China had proposed the notion of BRICS+, viz extension of the BRICS membership beyond the five member states. It is worth considering at this stage that China’s proposition, although failing to obtain the necessary consensus for it to pass, also sought to include several African countries whose economies hold the promise of helping to advance the overall mandate of the BRICS. Had this proposition received an unequivocal green light from other BRICS countries, it would have fulfilled China’s long-held ambition to garner the requisite support that would enhance its global standing as the leader of the Global South. Speaking in Addis Ababa on the occasion of the Second Ministerial Conference of the China-Africa Cooperation in December 2003, the then Prime Minister of China, Wen Jiabao, expressed China’s readiness “to co-ordinate its positions with African countries in the process of international rules formulation and multilateral trade negotiations” (FMPRC, 2003). In light of these pronouncements, Hodzi and Yu-Wen (2018) contend that China is a “revisionist power seeking to challenge the existing international order so as to establish a parallel order, or, at least, materially revise the existing one”


The inclusion of South Africa into the group, which came at the behest of China to make up BRICS, became a powerful economic bloc accounting for 20 percent of global GDP (Tralac, 2014). The fact that China successfully lobbied for the inclusion of South Africa into the alliance is telling of the economic clout it has in the BRICS alliance and it is further telling of the influence it wishes to exert as a *de facto* leader of the Global South. Furthermore, having the latter included in the grouping served the strategic importance of legitimizing Beijing as an ally that has the best interest of the continent at heart. For a while now, South Africa has always been viewed by the rest of the world as the entrepot to the African continent, owing largely to the sophistication of her economy, the size of its gross domestic product (GDP) (as largest on the continent at the time of joining BRICS), good infrastructure, and the promise of success and results-driven cooperation its economy offered. The case Beijing made for South Africa’s inclusion most probably followed this logic, a success for the country’s economic diplomacy given that it managed to galvanize most (if not all) significant economic players from strategic geopolitical regions in the Global South to rally behind it. Although China has been engaging with South Africa before South Africa’s ascension to BRICS, one can argue that bringing the former into the mix was an attempt to have the already existing relationship with the continent deepened further. Similarly, and as it will be shown in the section to follow, China’s economic relationship with the continent began intensifying in the second decade of the millennium either in the

form of trade, development assistance (aid), or loans even though it had begun doing the works during the first decade of the 2000s.

5. BEIJING'S AID, TRADE AND INVESTMENT CHARM OFFENSIVE

To Beijing Africa has offered a value proposition that necessitated – from the economic standpoint – the kind of capital injection that will position Beijing as a dependable ally of the continent with genuine interest to help unlock its economic potential. It has in many ways embarked on a drive to delegitimize Africa's traditional economic partners from the West. Indeed, in practice, Beijing has kept its share of the bargain with its foreign investments on the continent flowing rapidly since the turn of the century. For instance, the meager \$10 billion China invested in the continent in 2000 have since seen a 20-fold increase to \$220 billion in 2014 according to the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University (CARI, 2017). Along the same line, Beijing has invested in many railways and port construction projections (in East Africa) aimed at facilitating Africa's participation in the so-called Maritime Silk Route which forms the basis of Beijing's inclusion of mainly the East Coast of Africa into the One Belt One Road (OBOB). Examples include the planned 759 km route Addis Ababa-Djibouti railways to the cost of US\$4.5 billion, the US\$11 billion for the construction of a port in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, and the recently completed Nairobi-Mombasa railway, said to have come at the cost of US\$3.2 billion (Deloitte Insights, 2019).

The same level of commitment is also demonstrated in the value of trade between Beijing and the African continent as reported by the *Financial Times* of London, amongst other publications (Financial Times, 2017). Relative to the value of trade exchanged between the continent and the United States since the first decade of the 2000s, the value of trade between China and the continent has risen steadily, only coming second after the United States. As shown in the diagram below, the tables began to turn during the second decade of the 2000s, which saw the value of trade between China and the continent, surpassing that of the United States. Although the value of trade between Africa and China dropped severely from the over US\$220 billion peak of 2015 to under US\$150 billion in 2017, it far surpasses the US\$49 billion value of US-Africa trade (Moyo, 2016).



Source: Financial Times (2017).

The nature of China-Africa trade is subject to various interpretations, many of which speak to the growing importance of the continent to China's long-term economic future. The first six years of the millennium saw China importing a slightly higher number of goods from Africa than it exported to the continent (CARI, 2017). Although the year 2007 saw a change in this pattern, with Beijing importing less than it did before, 2008 saw a slight resurgence of imports in China despite the sharp economic decline that gripped the world economy with imports mainly dominated by oil. Table 1 shows that this trend in China-Africa trade continued well into 2009 with Angola emerging as China's top trade partner in Africa and whose oil production only came second after Nigeria, as shown in Table 2. By 2018, the situation had barely changed, save for South Africa replacing Angola as Africa's top trading partner followed closely by Africa's top oil producers such as Nigeria, Egypt, and Algeria respectively, according to China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (ECNS, 2018). Nevertheless, the number of exports from Africa to China took a meteoric rise, which peaked in 2013 to the value of US\$120 billion compared to US\$92 billion worth of Chinese exports to the region, according to CARI.

Table 1: China's top trade partners in Sub-Saharan Africa relative to overall Sino-Africa trade, 2009 and 2018 (Percentage).

| Country | Percentage (%) | |
|-------------------|----------------|------|
| | 2009 | 2018 |
| South Africa | 17,6 | 21,3 |
| Angola | 18,7 | 13,7 |
| Congo | 2,3 | 3,5 |
| Congo, DR | 1,6 | 3,6 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 1,5 | 1,1 |
| Nigeria | 6,9 | 7,4 |
| Sudan | 7,0 | 1,2 |
| Zambia | 1,5 | 2,4 |

Source: Estimates and calculations by author (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018).

Table 2: Oil production and reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa.

| Country | Production * (bbl/day) | Proven reserves ** (000's barrels) |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| – Nigeria | 2,211,000 (15) | 37,500,000 (10) |
| – Angola | 1,948,009 (17) | 13,500,00 (15) |
| – Sudan | 486,700 (31) | 8,800,000 (20) |
| – Congo, Republic of the | 274,400 (39) | 1,600,000 (37) |
| – Gabon | 241,700 (41) | 2,000,000 (35) |
| – South Africa | 191,000 (43) | 15,000,000 (87) |
| – Chad | 115,000 (51) | 1,500,000 (39) |
| – Cameroon | 77,310 (55) | 200,000 (58) |
| – Cote d'Ivoire | 58,950 (60) | 250,000 (57) |
| – Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 16,360 (78) | 180,000 (61) |

* Production figure is for 2009.

** Proven reserves as of 29 April 2011.

Figures in parentheses are world rankings.

Source: CIA World Factbook (in Edoho, 2011).

However, these trends still leave an important question hanging in the air; how does China-Africa trade compare to Africa-BRICS trade and China-BRICS trade as a whole? And to follow up, how significant is the trade volume between China and the respective regions represented by each one of the BRICS member states? Compared to Asia, which trades the most with China of all regions represented by a BRICS member state, Africa seems to be trading the least with China, with Sino-South Africa trade accounting for only 27,18 percent of the overall China-Africa trade in 2014, a figure that marginally declined to 25,7 percent in 2015. When compared with the rest of the BRICS countries, China trades with Africa the least, with overall China-Africa trade in 2014 accounting for 6,2 percent of China-BRICS trade, a figure that declined to 5,5 percent the following year. These estimates are a far cry from figures showing China-Asia trade, which accounts for 64,3 percent of overall China-BRICS trade for 2015, a marginal decline from 65,3 percent of 2014. Also, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Africa contracted significantly from US\$28 billion in 2005 (Alden, 2005) to a little over US\$20 billion in 2018, representing a drop of 28.5 percent (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018).

Table 3: Africa-BRICS trade categorized by product, 2016.

| Product Code | Gross Exports | Gross Imports |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| Food and live animals | \$2,505,760 | \$11,299,454 |
| Beverages and tobacco | \$971,208 | \$649,459 |
| Crude materials, inedible, except fuels | \$3,350,176 | \$1,722,330 |
| Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials | \$13,444,084 | \$5,241,207 |
| Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes | \$39,776 | \$593,275 |
| Chemicals and related products n.e.s | \$2,289,344 | \$9,398,479 |
| Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material | \$2,463,633 | \$19,553,536 |
| Machinery and transport | \$564,243 | \$29,817,547 |
| Miscellaneous manufactured articles | \$343,618 | \$7,400,247 |
| Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC | \$4,900,232 | \$246,212 |
| Total | \$30,872,073 | \$85,921,746 |

Source: Dodd (2019).

The relatively low levels of trade between the two-member countries of BRICS, i.e., South Africa and China – despite seeing a resurgence recently – are without a doubt symptomatic of the unevenness and unequal nature of China-Africa trade as a whole, which has given primacy to oil to the benefit of China's economy in the long run as shown in Table 2 and Table 3, which shows mineral fuels dominate Africa-BRICS trade by accounting for 43 percent of exports. Compared to China-BRICS trade, China-South Africa trade fell sharply from a buoyant 27 percent as a proportion of China-Africa trade to a worryingly low level of 21.3 percent between 2016 and 2018. Meanwhile, South Africa has on average contributed 36 percent of China's total imports from Africa since 2014, with imports from the former as a proportion of China-Africa trade contracting to 32 percent in 2017 and falling yet again to 27.4 percent in 2018 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016, 2017 and 2018).

6. CONCLUSIONS

While the proceedings of the 19th Congress make no explicit mention of Africa-China relations or China's relationship with the rest of the BRICS countries, the policy outcomes of the Congress will have far-reaching implications for both. BRICS will remain central to China's economic diplomacy, which relies heavily on maintaining goodly relations with other Global South countries, and there is no doubt that *that* equation has set sights on Africa as an important consideration. The many strides China has made on the continent, be it in the form of trade or investments, were designed from the outset to serve as legitimacy building tools to bolster its image as a reliable friend of the continent that has the best interests of Africa at heart. There is no doubt that the inclusion of South Africans into the group, which came mainly at the behest of China was

aimed to facilitate this move. This is the case, not least when considering the fact that South Africa's economy continues to pale in comparison to other economies of BRICS.

Western retreat from the continent in such areas as foreign direct investments since the end of the Cold War – a trend which continued well into the 2000s – has worked in Beijing's favor as many African countries looked to it for investments and development partnerships. The OBOR – which featured prominently during the 19th Congress of the Party – has built on these possibilities as Beijing seeks to forge stronger partnerships with the developing world, including countries in Africa that were previously not on her radar. And while bilateral trade between Beijing and South Africa increased exponentially since 2010, it has yet to translate into China replacing the European Union as Africa's main trading partner.

Conflict of Interest

None.

References

- Abdenur AE. 2014. China and the BRICS Development Bank: Legitimacy and multilateralism in South-South cooperation", *IDS Bulletin*, 45(4):85-101.
- Alden C. 2005. China in Africa. *Survival*, 47(3):147–164.
- Bond P. 2019. Assimilation, co-optation, and resistance within BRICS from the middle. In: van der Merwe J, Bond P, Dodd N (eds), *BRICS and Resistance in Africa: Contention, Assimilation and Co-optation*, London: Zed Books, pp. 43-72.
- BRICS. 2017. BRICS leaders' Xiamen declaration. https://www.brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201709/t20170908_2021.html
- CARI. 2017. Data: China-Africa Trade. <http://www.sais-carl.org/data-china-africa-trade>
- Cheng JYS, Shi H. 2009. China's African policy in the post-cold war era", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 39(1):86-115.
- Deloitte Insights. 2019. If you want to prosper, consider building roads – China's role in African infrastructure and capital projects. <https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/china-investment-africa-infrastructure-development.html>
- Dodd N. 2019. BRICS' trade with Africa: long live the new king, just like the old king. In: van der Merwe J, Bond P, Dodd N (eds), *BRICS and Resistance in Africa: Contention, Assimilation and Co-optation*. London: Zed Books, pp. 73-96.
- ECNS. 2018. China-Africa in numbers: trade ties. <http://www.ecns.cn/news/economy/2018-09-04/detail-ifyxpqun1875058.shtml>
- Edoho F. 2011. Globalisation and marginalisation of Africa; contextualisation of China-Africa relations. *Africa Today*, 58(1):104-124.
- Financial Times. 2017. Chinese investments in Africa: Beijing's testing ground. <https://www.ft.com/content/0f534aa4-4549-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996>
- FMPRC. 2003. Address by H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at the Opening of the Second Ministerial Conference of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflit/eng/zyzl/zyjh/t157711.htm>
- Hodzi O. 2018. Delegitimization and 'Re-socialisation': China and the diffusion of alternative norms in Africa. *International Studies*, 55(4):297–314.
- Hodzi O, Yu-Wen C. 2018. Following the flow: China's approach to global leadership. *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 4(1):1-21.
- Jinping X. 2017. Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf
- Johnston L, Rudyak M. 2017. China's innovative and pragmatic' foreign aid: Shaped by and now shaping globalisation. In: Song L *et al.* (eds), *China's new sources of economic growth: human capital, innovation and technological change*. Acton: Australian National University Press.
- Kwaa-Prah K. 2007. Introduction: defining a relationship. In: Kwaa-Prah K (ed), *Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future*. Cape Town: CASAS, pp. 1-23.
- Lesufi I, Thompson L. 2019. China in Africa: South-South solidarity or imperialism in the 21st century. In: van der Merwe J, Bond P, Dodd N (eds), *BRICS and Resistance in Africa: Contention, Assimilation and Co-optation*. London: Zed Books, pp. 97-115.
- Lumumba KT. 2011. China-Africa relations: A neo-imperialism or neo-colonialism? A reflection. *African and Asian Studies*, 10(2-3):234-266.
- Monyae D, Nganje F. 2019. BRICS and regional industrialisation in Southern Africa – partners or spoiler? The case of China. *Africa Insight*, 48(4):3-20.
- Moyo S. 2016. Perspectives on South-South relations: China's presence in Africa. *Inter Asia Cultural Studies*, 17(1):58-67.
- National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2016. Value of imports and exports by country (region) of origin/destination. <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm>
- National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2017. Value of imports and exports by country (region) of origin/destination. <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/indexeh.htm>
- National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2018. Value of imports and exports by country (region) of origin/destination. <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm>
- Shamase M. 2019. The role of China in the BRICS' cooperation on development shaping a new and balanced world order? *Africa Insight*, 48(4):105-125.
- Summers T. 2016. China's 'new silk roads' initiative: Sub-regional regions and networks of global economy. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9):1628-1643.
- Taylor I. 2009a. *China's New Role in Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Taylor I. 2009b. *Africa Rising? BRICS – Diversifying Dependency*. New York: James Currey.
- Taylor I. 2016. The BRICS in Africa: Agents of Development? In: van der Merwe J, Taylor I, Arkhangelskaya A (eds). *Emerging powers in Africa*. International Political Economy Series, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 39-55.
- Taylor I. 2018. Africa and the BRICS: In Whose Interests? In: Oloruntoba S, Falola T (eds). *The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 723-736.
- Tralac. 2014. BRICS economies not crashing: Economist. <https://www.tralac.org/news/article/5415-brics-economies-not-crashing-economist.html>
- Wang F, Elliot E. 2014. China in Africa: Presence, perceptions and prospects. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23(90):1012-1032.
- Wenping H. 2007. All weather friend: The evolution of China's African policy. In: Kwaa-Prah K (ed), *Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future*, Cape Town: CASAS, pp. 24-47.
- World Bank. 2017. Country Overview: China. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>